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TAKING ONE FOR THE TEAM: PRINCIPLE OF TREATY 
ADHERENCE AS A SOCIAL IMPERATIVE FOR PRESERVING 
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LEGITIMACY 
AS UPHELD IN IN RE WORLD WAR II ERA JAPANESE FORCED 
LABOR LITIGATION1 
But among those in the political establishment who have followed the sparse 
Japanese media coverage of the suits, there is growing anxiety and barely 
concealed resentment.  Some see greedy U.S. lawyers plotting to mug “deep-
pocket” Japanese companies, which are vulnerable because they do business in 
the United States, over a reparations issue that Japan believed was settled by 
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty . . . .  “This is really a form of extortion,” 
said a source close to the Japanese government . . . .  Managers and employees 
of the blue-chip corporations being sued who were born in the postwar 
period . . . may well view the lawsuits as a business opportunity for U.S. 
litigators and defense attorneys.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
During times of global upheaval, the preservation of the international legal 
schematic proves essential.  Indeed, the events surrounding the September 11th 
tragedy demand such preservation.  As affiliates of the United Nations scamper 
to adopt and alter applicable resolutions on terrorism, nationals of individual 
states ponder their own internal strategies in an effort to cope with sadness, 
rage and a peculiar sense of helplessness.  Once the emotional cloud dissipates, 
however, families of victims and domestic organizations will no doubt begin to 
inquire about their rights to recovery and degrees of compensation for their 
respective losses.3  A right to private redress in American tribunals as a 
 
 1. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) [hereinafter World War II Case]. 
 2. Sonni Efron, Pursuit of WWII Redress Hits Japanese Boardrooms; Courts: As Lawsuits 
Begin to Mount, Anxiety and Resentment Grow in Tokyo Over Alleged Victims’ “Extortion”, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at A1. 
 3. On November 5, 2001, the Justice Department disclosed its efforts to create a fund for 
victims of the September 11th tragedy.  Soon after the disaster, Congress passed legislation in an 
effort to pool funds to cover the lost earnings of victims and to compensate both them and their 
families for subsequent pain and suffering.  For purposes of creating a rational system for 
distribution of the funds, the Justice Department has suggested that all prospective beneficiaries 
who apply to the fund receive compensation within 120 days of application.  By seeking aid from 
the survivor’s fund, “applicants [would] forfeit the right to sue the airlines, insurance companies, 
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response to international atrocities has long been a question for the United 
States legal system.  While victim’s of international aggression at times receive 
justice, others are asked to “take one for the team” and turn the other cheek in 
favor of international harmony.  With its resurgence in 1999,4 this topic has 
been rigorously debated in both federal and state venues. 
Decided on September 21, 2000, the World War II Case represented the 
efforts of a class of aggrieved veterans who sought redress in a California state 
court for the inhumane acts imposed upon them subsequent to their capture by 
Japanese forces in 1941.5  The original representative in the class action suit, 
James King, set forth a detailed account of his capture and injuries while 
working in a Japanese steel mill.6  Despite their efforts, King and his associates 
were denied access to compensation in a federal tribunal because of the 
binding terms of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, established between President 
Truman and the remains of the Japanese Empire.7  As a matter of basic treaty 
law, where the terms of a treaty are unambiguous, the court must rule in 
accordance with the plain language of the treaty.8  Conversely, in ambiguous 
treaty scenarios, courts possess the option to consult the history and purpose of 
negotiation to supplement its plain meaning analysis.9  Rooted in a laundry list 
of similar holdings handed down from U.S. domestic tribunals, this theory of 
judicial deference afforded in treaty scenarios is, indeed, nothing new.10  
 
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and others for potentially greater damages.”  
See Carrie Johnson, Justice Dept. to Open Victim’s Fund Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at 
A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39471-2001Nov4.html (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2002).  Such a showing of Congressional intent for an individual to trade his or 
her right to sue for nominal damages is significant.  This strategy of claim preclusion has become 
quite popular with both the Legislative and Executive Branches when met with litigation 
scenarios that could damage national progression and morale.  Id. 
 4. In 1999, numerous claimants from the World War II era began seeking redress in 
domestic tribunals for alleged human rights atrocities committed by Germany and her allies.  See 
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250 (D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor 
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431-32 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 5. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
 6. Id. (“When captured, King was 20 years old, 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 167 
pounds.  At the conclusion of the war, he weighed 98 pounds.”). 
 7. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens: Diplomatic Protections and International Claims, 
95 AM. J. INT’L L. 139, 140 (2001). 
 8. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961) (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 
U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933)) (noting that the principles of international law recognize no right to 
extradition apart from a treaty). 
 9. See World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945-46 (stating that “[t]o the extent that 
[treaty language] raises any uncertainty, however, the court ‘may look beyond the written words 
to the history of the treaty’”); see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989). 
 10. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921), and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 
(1913), represent judicial landmarks in the area of treaty deference. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] TAKING ONE FOR THE TEAM 1093 
Because numerous legal scholars have addressed the relationship between 
foreign relations and domestic law in great detail,11 this Note will expose 
nothing new with reference to that topic.  The novelty of this Note lies rather in 
the policy argument presented. 
This Note mainly will examine the international policy stemming from 
judicial decisions that consider treaties as paramount to domestic law.  Often, 
citizens of sovereign nations view international legal scenarios through 
domestic lenses only.  In short, international citizens frequently desire a 
resolution to international disputes in a fashion that will reap a sizable benefit 
to them, despite its possible adverse effects on the global system.  Decisions 
such as the World War II Case properly aim to think “outside the domestic 
box” and lend support to the intentions of a few insightful politicians who wish 
to view the United States as a member of a greater “international team.”  As 
skepticism mounts in response to the alleged ineffectiveness of international 
law, the World War II Case offers a breath of fresh air.  Simply, this case 
proves that the international system actually works. 
To that end, this Note is divided into five remaining parts.  Part II explores 
the subtle nuances of the World War II Case itself, while Part III assesses its 
historical legal roots from both home and abroad.12  Excerpts from applicable 
foreign rulings reside in this portion of the Note to illustrate similarities in 
judicial rationale used by courts when resolving wartime claims, regardless of 
their geographic placement. 
Part IV offers a legal analysis of treaties, such as the 1951 Treaty of Peace, 
their relationship to conflicting domestic and international laws, and a legal 
exercise that outlines possible arguments of plaintiffs under customary 
international human rights law.  Initially, Part IV focuses on the World War II 
Case court’s basic analysis of the 1951 Treaty of Peace through accepted 
notions of treaty interpretation.  In addition to explicitly barring a remedy to 
plaintiffs, the treaty takes precedence over the conflicting California state law 
as a matter of domestic constitutional law.13  Following an analysis of the 
World War II Case court’s basic legal rationale, this Note will explore other 
 
 11. See K. Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 277, 
328 (2001); Developments in the Law—Corporate Liability for Violations of International 
Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2030-31 (2001). 
 12. While not concerned with treaties per se, the rationale behind both the South African and 
Chilean decisions, discussed in Part III.B, share stark similarities to those made within the 
confines of the American judiciary.  Significant monetary compensation for human rights 
offenses was seen as secondary to the desire to live in financial and social international harmony.  
See Azanian Peoples Org. v. The President of the Rep. of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 637 (CC), 
available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za/data/CL/1796.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2002); Chanfeau 
Orayce v. Chile, Cases 11.505 et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R. 512, OEA/ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 7 rev. 
(1997), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1997/chile25-98html (last visited Mar. 
18, 2002). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) (1987). 
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possible arguments that could have been more fruitful for plaintiffs in the 
disputed matter.14  Specifically, plaintiffs could have argued that the treaty 
itself was invalid because it conflicted with a norm of customary international 
law.15  While such an argument is sound in theory, both international and 
domestic weaknesses persist. 
In Part V of the Note, a strict policy analysis provides support to the 
position that, if private claims are allowed in spite of treaty provisions which 
forbid even their existence, the effect on the international legal schematic will 
prove crippling.  As a policy issue, treaties may not be ignored for reasons of 
convenience or national interest.  When prominent nation states, such as the 
United States, unilaterally revoke the effectiveness of certain treaties, a 
harmful message of “non-compliance upon convenience” is conveyed to the 
international legal community.  Considering the less than stellar reputation of 
the United States in its treatment of and adherence to international agreements, 
the time has come for the United States to make a statement in support of 
honoring its duty to comply with agreements that seek to solidify its bond with 
the global community. 
II.  BEGINNING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IN RE WORLD WAR II ERA 
JAPANESE FORCED LABOR LITIGATION 
The claim involved in the World War II Case was originally brought by 
James King, a veteran of the Second World War, on behalf of a host of other 
veterans,16 before a California state court under the California Code of Civil 
Procedure § 354.6.17  The California code provision was relatively untested 
until the present action was brought.  Specifically, it permitted an action by a 
prisoner of war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, “to recover 
compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor 
victim, . . . from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor 
was performed.”18  The named defendants quickly motioned for and succeeded 
in removal to a federal tribunal.19  Such a move was proper because the 
 
 14. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 15. JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 198 (1996). 
 16. In addition to Count I, which was brought specifically under the California Code of Civil 
Procedure, Count II sought to recover on an unjust enrichment claim in which the plaintiff sought 
disgorgement and restitution of economic benefits derived from his labor.  In Count III, the 
plaintiff sought damages for the torts of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
unlawful imprisonment.  Finally, Count IV sought damages from defendant’s failure to reveal its 
prior exploitation of prisoner labor to present day customers in California and elsewhere under a 
theory of unfair business practices.  See World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 944 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6(b) (West 1999). 
 19. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
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plaintiffs’ claims necessarily required determinations that directly and 
significantly affected United States foreign relations, making this issue a 
federal question.20  Upon removal, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California was left to resolve: (1) whether the suit should 
be remanded to state court; and (2) whether the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
was properly based on the principle of treaty preclusion.21  Because the court 
disposed of the venue controversy with relative ease under 28 U.S.C. § 
1441(a), it serves no purpose to elaborate on that topic.  The focus of this 
Note’s analysis will instead concentrate on both the treaty-based preclusion 
argument and the ensuing policy created from the aftermath of the decision. 
A. The Court Honors the Agreement 
To provide an initial frame of reference, the exact language of Article 14 
of the 1951 Treaty of Peace is provided to illustrate the unambiguous nature of 
its terminology.  The Treaty of Peace provided in part: 
(1) a grant of authority of Allied Powers to seize Japanese property within their 
jurisdiction at the time of the treaty’s effective date; (2) an obligation of Japan 
to assist in the rebuilding of territory occupied by Japanese forces during the 
war and (3) waiver of all “other claims of the Allied Powers and their 
nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the 
course of the prosecution of the war.”22 
Echoing the principles of its judicial predecessors in Sullivan and Kolovrat,23 
the World War II Case court upheld the principle that where the verbiage of a 
treaty is quite unambiguous, the court’s analysis will end there and the plain 
meaning of the instrument will prevail.24  In the World War II Case, the court 
insisted that the waiver language present in the above treaty provision was 
 
 20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) (providing that “any civil action brought in a State court 
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 
defendant”); see also Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (asserting the 
“proprietary of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in 
federal court”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (explaining that 
the Court was “constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding 
the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our 
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as 
an aspect of federal law”).  Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6(b) (West 1999), with Treaty 
of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, art. 14(a), 3 U.S.T. 1935, available at 
http://www.vcn.bc.ca/alpha/sfpt/SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty1951.htm (last visited June 16, 2002) 
(providing for the waiver of all “other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out 
of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war”). 
 21. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
 22. Id. at 945 (quoting Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, art. 14(a)(b), 3 
U.S.T. 1935) (emphasis added). 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 44-50. 
 24. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
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quite unambiguous.25  Thus, their analysis of the agreement, as a matter of 
domestic treaty interpretation, ended there.  To avoid the preclusive effect of 
the treaty, the plaintiffs sought to distinguish their claim from those falling 
under the agreement.  If successful, the plaintiffs could have asserted that their 
claims under state law did not conflict with the provisions of the treaty and, 
thus, escaped preemption under the Supremacy Clause.26  They suggested that 
the authors of the treaty had no intention of waiving the claims of prisoners of 
war because the treaty failed to expressly include such claims in the waiver 
itself.27  The court was quick to strike such a narrow assertion however, 
because it felt, in accordance with the strict language of Article 19(b), the 
Treaty of Peace envisaged the waiver of “all claims” regarding Japanese 
wartime atrocities.28  The court held that the waiver was broad enough to 
encompass the present litigation; there was no need to insert an amendment for 
clarification.29 
B. An Eye on Policy 
Bearing a stark resemblance to the rationale set forth in a matter 
concerning South Africa,30 the World War II Case court stressed policy as an 
over-riding reason for keeping the terms and enforcement provisions of the 
treaty in tact.  Beyond the actual text of the document, the court, citing 
numerous politicians, indicated that the underlying purpose of the waiver was 
to achieve a sense of finality.31  As stated by the chief negotiator of the 1951 
Treaty of Peace, John Foster Dulles, “leaving open the possibility of future 
claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace.”32  Further 
rationale behind the comments of Dulles can best be demonstrated by his role 
in other post-war negotiations. 
 
 25. Id. at 946 (adding that “[n]evertheless, the court has conducted its own review of the 
historical materials, and concludes that they reinforce the conclusion”). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that “[t]his Constitution and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in [p]ursuance thereof, and all [t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the [a]uthority of the United States, shall be the supreme [l]aw of the land, and the [j]udges in 
every [s]tate shall be bound thereby”). 
 27. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
 28. Id. (articulating that “Article 19(b) states that the Japanese waiver included ‘any claims 
and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the 
Allied Powers’”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 31. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 946. 
 32. Id.  Dulles went on to say that demanding reparations of Japan directly following the war 
would have hindered their economy to the point of financial impracticability.  Since that time, 
however, Japan has emerged as one of the world’s most efficient and prominent economic 
powerhouses.  The plaintiffs in the present action cited this change as reason for payment.  Id. at 
947. 
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As the World War II Case court hinted in its decision, the negotiating 
parties of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, specifically Dulles, had the future upswing 
of Communism in mind when agreeing to the treaty’s provisions.33  Recalling 
his involvement in the Paris Peace Conference at the close of World War I in 
1919, Dulles remembered his unsuccessful efforts in convincing his fellow 
countrymen that burdening the Germans with hefty reparations would send 
their economy into a downward spiral.34  Arguably, such an economic 
depression gave rise to Nazi sentiments, seeking to revive the German State 
under a common socialist philosophy.  In turn, Dulles vowed not to let history 
repeat itself upon the close of World War II.35  Imposing heavy reparations 
upon Japan, in his opinion, would make them susceptible to the emerging 
Communist movement in Asia.  A waiver of future private claims against both 
Japan and its corporations would provide it with the economic stability to 
combat a Communist ideology brewing in neighboring China.  The court in the 
dispute at issue agreed with the sentiments of Dulles and sought to uphold the 
treaty provisions based upon the preservation of established foreign policy.  
Judge Vaughn Walker suggested, as follows: 
[B]ecause of the success of the [1951 Treaty of Peace] and of Japan in 
becoming a strong ally and partner of the United States, the waiver of 
individual rights to pursue private parties in Japan was justified. This has been 
the argument in the dozens of suits brought in Japan and a smaller number of 
cases in American courts. And the argument has so far prevailed. . . . Japan’s 
reparation deals with some countries might present the opportunity for the 
signatory nations of 1951 to bring their own claims, as provided for in Article 
26 of the treaty.  However, “the question of enforcing Article 26” . . . is “for 
the United States, not the plaintiffs, to decide.”36 
Similar sentiments were conveyed by the U.S. Department of State Legal 
Advisor, Ronald J. Bettauer, when the World War II Case was pending in 
California.  In his expert opinion, Bettauer stated that “[t]he overarching intent 
of those who negotiated, signed, and ultimately ratified this [t]reaty was to 
bring about a complete, global settlement of all war-related claims, in order to 
provide both compensation to the victims of the war and to rebuild Japan’s 
 
 33. Id. at 946. 
 34. Steven C. Clemons, Recovering Japan’s Wartime Past—and Ours, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
2001, at A23. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id.  Judge Walker suggested that Japan entered into specific agreements with other 
signatories of the 1951 Treaty, namely the Netherlands, in an effort to overcome the waiver to 
private reparations.  Walker suggested further that such an agreement, which permits certain 
nations to sue privately despite the waiver provision, lies within the discretion of the federal 
government of the nation in question.  He further commented that citizens of the United States 
should honor the informed decision of their elected politicians in an effort to preserve 
international business relations.  Id. 
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economy and convert Japan into a strong U.S. ally.”37  Furthermore, he noted 
that the United States government instituted additional compensatory schemes, 
assuring that the victims of the war atrocities were made whole.38  In short, the 
court shared the view of its counterparts in the State Department that “the 
immeasurable bounty of life for [the victims] and their posterity in a free 
society and in a more peaceful world service[d] the debt” owed to them.39  
Unbeknownst to the court at the time of the World War II Case, such a policy 
of “progress over vengeance” would be re-affirmed a year later by a federal 
court in New Jersey.40 
III.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY DEFERENCE 
When dissecting a court decision that has a similar rationale to prior cases, 
it is essential to expose particular principles echoed by each court.  Such 
continued rationale is found in the line of cases prior to the World War II Case.  
The first principle involved is the premise that when nations establish a treaty, 
or a treaty-like mechanism, both the purpose and policy assigned to it by the 
negotiating parties, namely the executive branches of each nation state, will be 
controlling.41  In the context of individual war reparations, “[t]he war-related 
claims of individual citizens can be asserted only by their government,”42 
promoting a unified national voice.  The second common principle expands 
upon the first.  When nations agree to alternative venues and methods for 
monetary redress, they do so under the assumption that availing oneself of the 
traditional legal process will pose recovery obstacles for victims.43 
 
 37. Murphy, supra note 7, at 140 (citing Former U.S. World War II POW’s: A Struggle For 
Justice: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 14, 14-15 (2000)). 
 38. Id. (“The scheme of the [t]reaty was that each state party would compensate its own 
nationals for their injuries, either out of confiscated Japanese public and private assets, or 
otherwise . . . .  The U.S. Congress amended the War Claims Act of 1948 to create new war 
claims programs that would award American war victims. . . .”). 
 39. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 40. In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defs. Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372 (D.N.J. 
2001) [hereinafter Nazi Era Cases]. 
 41. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961). 
 42. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 274 (D.N.J. 1999) (suggesting that 
such “war related claims, [even] those not explicitly addressed [in the treaty itself], are 
extinguished by [any resulting] peace settlement”). 
 43. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 489 (D.N.J. 1999) (“[T]he span 
between the doing of the damage and the application of the claimed assuagement is too vague.  
The time is too long.  The identity of the alleged tortfeasors is too indefinite.  The procedure 
sought . . . is too complicated, too costly. . . .”). 
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A. Decisions From Home—The United States’ Approach 
1. Yielding to Plain Treaty Language and Interpretation of the Executive 
Evinced by its legal tradition, the United States courts adhere to a plain 
meaning rule.  Cases in the past have illustrated the foundations of treaty 
interpretation.  As stated by Justice Day in Sullivan v. Kidd, a case which 
involved property rights of foreign nationals, “treaties are to be interpreted 
upon the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts in writing 
between individuals, and are to be executed in the utmost good faith, with a 
view to making effective the purposes of the high contracting parties.”44  The 
actual wording of the treaty in question is essential because it is assumed that 
the drafters of the agreement desired to leave each participating nation on 
equal footing.45  As in Sullivan, the Supreme Court was asked in Kolovrat v. 
Oregon to resolve another internationally tempered property dispute.46  
However, Kolovrat was distinguishable from Sullivan because it sought to go 
beyond the plain meaning of the instrument.  Enforcing a 1948 Treaty, 
Kolovrat deferred authority to interpretations of the Executive Branch, desiring 
to “bring about . . . stability and uniformity in the difficult field of world 
monetary controls and exchange.”47  Justice Black’s majority opinion 
expressed his skepticism regarding whether such interpretations could ever be 
effectively realized considering the limited language of the agreement.  
However, despite his argument that the agreement may fall short of its goal, 
Justice Black recognized that the Executive Branch of the United States had 
spoken, and that the “power to make policy with regard to such matters is a 
national one from the compulsion of both necessity and our Constitution.”48  
 
 44. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (emphasis added).  Here, Sullivan was met 
with a property rights issue and interpreted the effect of a beneficiary’s foreign nationality on his 
rights to inherit land in the United States.  The court held that notice of such transfer of 
possession was required of both foreign and U.S nationals, preserving reciprocity and equality.  
Id. at 442-43. 
 45. Id. at 439.  “[T]he general purpose and object of such conventions [are] to secure 
equality in exchange of privileges and reciprocity in rights granted and secured.”  Id. at 440. 
 46. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).  Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 
(1961), with Treaty of Commerce Between the United States of America and Serbia, 1881, U.S.-
Serb., arts. 1-3, 22 Stat. 963, 964 (illustrating that while the Oregon Statute sought to limit the 
property rights of foreign nationals with respect to domestic U.S. plots, the treaty afforded 
Yugoslavians and Serbian nationals “the liberty to acquire and dispose of such property”). 
 47. Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 198.  The Court reiterated that “if these rights of acquiring, 
possessing or disposing . . . were not afforded . . . the Treaty’s effectiveness in achieving its 
express purpose of ‘facilitating . . . commercial relations’ would obviously be severely limited.”  
Id. at 194.  As taken from Supreme Court case law, domestic principles of treaty interpretation 
insist that the judiciary adhere to particular interpretations of the Executive.  Such a notion creates 
a separation of powers issue.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 198. 
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Thus, the courts in both Sullivan and Kolovrat displayed their lack of 
competence to enact policy contrary to clearly articulated treaty provisions or 
varying Executive interpretations.  Such recognition is rooted in the principles 
of exclusive commitment as defined in Article II of the United States 
Constitution.49  Hence, the interpretation of the Executive Branch should 
prevail.50 
2. Alternative Venues and Methods of Monetary Redress 
Because the World War II Case began in protest to a grant of reparations to 
Japanese prison camp survivors, a discussion of such reparations as alternative 
forms of compensation is important.  In recent years, domestic courts have 
been urged to treat an individual and his claim against a foreign nation as the 
same entity.  Simply, one’s claim “is only a right of his government against 
that of the [alleged defendant].”51  This principle was applied in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan,52 where, as a result of its withholding hostages in 1979, Iran 
lost its access to certain national assets.  Subsequently, the United States 
Government traded away American citizens’ ability to collect debts against 
Iranian corporations in American courts.53  In spite of such a limitation on the 
venue in which redress could be obtained, aggrieved parties sought 
enforcement of liens and attachments against Iran within a designated Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal.54  Apart from the fact that the Claims Tribunal 
removed a number of jurisdictional and procedural obstacles to recovery, 
providing such a forum meant “that the claimants [would receive] something in 
return for the suspension of their claims, namely, access to an international 
tribunal.”55  Arguably, recovery rates were not affected by such a designation. 
 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2 (stating that “[the President] shall have power, by and with the 
[a]dvice and [c]onsent of the Senate, to make [t]reaties”); see discussion infra Part III (providing 
a more in-depth discussion of how the separation of powers allows for the President to make 
treaties in a rather unchecked manner). 
 50. It should be noted here that while an Executive interpretation was not needed in the 
World War II Case because of the clear language of the applicable treaty provisions, the court did 
go a step beyond the minimum protocol and did include a reference to the interpretation of the 
Executive.  World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 51. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 274 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 902 (1987)). 
 52. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 53. Id. at 656 (permitting “the President to maintain foreign assets at his disposal for use in 
negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency [with] the frozen assets serv[ing] as 
‘bargaining chips’ to be used . . . when dealing with a hostile country”). 
 54. Id. at 687.  Congress implicitly approved the practice of claims settlement by executive 
agreement through their enactment of The International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.  The Act 
itself gave rise to the International Claims Commission, giving it “jurisdiction to make final and 
binding decisions with respect to claims by United States nationals.”  Id. at 657. 
 55. Id. at 687. 
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Almost a decade after Dames & Moore, the U. S. District Court for New 
Jersey was faced with similar problems in a case seeking compensation for 
forced labor in German factories during World War II.56  Because over thirty 
years passed between the alleged malfeasance and the legal proceeding, it was 
extremely difficult for a plaintiff to call witnesses to testify based upon their 
flawed memory of the alleged events.57  Any recovery was contingent upon the 
establishment of an alternative tribunal where such victims of slave labor could 
seek monetary redress.58  This forum was not available until the creation of 
The Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” (the 
“Foundation”) in July of 2000.59 
The Foundation was formed by agreement between President Bill Clinton 
and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in December of 1999.60  Subject to 
the provisions of the agreement, each aggrieved party was to seek redress from 
the Foundation exclusively in exchange for their verbal assurance that no 
private cause of action would surface in a United States court.61  President 
Clinton agreed to this alternative method of recovery because of the relatively 
“advanced age of victims” and his desire to show results as soon as possible 
through a mechanism of expedited payment.62  To date, almost $100 billion 
has been paid out as reparations to Nazi Era victims.  Including moneys 
contributed primarily by the German private sector, the Foundation expects to 
 
 56. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (D.N.J. 1999).  Resembling the 
factual basis for the plaintiffs’ claim in the World War II Case, Plaintiff Iwanowa claimed that 
Ford Motor Company “coerced her, and thousands of other persons, to perform forced labor 
under inhuman conditions.”  Id.  Specifically, she sought “compensation for the reasonable value 
of her services.”  Id. at 432. 
 57. Id. at 489. 
 58. See Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (D.N.J. 2001). Historically, the Paris, 
Transition, and London Debt Agreements made between Germany and the Allied Powers 
remained silent on issues of private reparation claims.  On September 12, 1990, the 2+4 Treaty 
reunited Germany and returned to it the ability to handle both foreign and domestic affairs.  Id. at 
377. 
 59. Id. at 379. 
 60. Id.  The initiative to create such a quasi-claims settlement tribunal was fostered as early 
as 1998 by both the German Chancellor and various German corporations.  Such an initiative 
culminated in the Chancellor’s meeting with President Clinton a year later.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 379.  Compare Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” Dec. 
1999, U.S.-F.R.G., with Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, art. 14(a), 3 
U.S.T. 3169 (illustrating that both agreements provided for nominal monetary recovery to victims 
in exchange for claim preclusion in United States courts). 
 62. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (“The position of the United States government 
recommending dismissal is motivated by the twin concerns of justice and urgency: matters of 
Holocaust-Era restitution are best resolved through dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation as 
opposed to prolonged and uncertain litigation . . . [providing] some measure of justice and 
compensation to aged victims in their lifetimes.”). 
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pay an additional $4.3 billion.63  In short, the Foundation, a treaty-like 
mechanism, supported the overall premise that international agreements were 
worthwhile and effective alternatives to private causes of action.  The 
“effectiveness” of the alternative can be gauged in terms of both economic 
benefits and increased convenience. 
As evinced in the Nazi Era Cases, often the plaintiffs who are part of 
reparations claims are parties to a class action lawsuit.  When parties avail 
themselves of a class action lawsuit, they will most likely receive, if the suit is 
successful, an amount comparable to an amount that the Foundation posits to 
provide.  Because damage awards in civil trials are distributed between 
attorneys and fellow plaintiffs, one may be better off simply collecting from 
the alternative tribunal or recovery instrument.  Thus, in terms of economics, 
the alternative tribunal may be a more attractive alternative.64 
In terms of convenience, a possible litigant should view the alternative 
tribunal as superior.  When politicians form alternative recovery instruments, 
such an instrument is the product of their work for the sole benefit of aggrieved 
parties.  In a sense, the aggrieved parties are spoon-fed an opportunity to 
recover for the atrocities committed against them.  Organizational efforts are 
minimized so that aggrieved parties are required only to submit their names 
into a pool of applicants to be considered for relief. 
B. Decisions From Abroad—Actions Taken by South Africa and Chile 
While rights to private actions were bargained away by American 
politicians throughout the twentieth century via treaty provisions, nations 
located in distant hemispheres of the globe implemented similar non-suit 
provisions against their own citizens.  While not dealing with wars waged 
against foreign nation states, both the South African and Chilean governments 
established claim preclusion agreements regarding intrastate wars prompted by 
rogue government organizations.  When viewed in connection with the World 
War II Case, the purpose and implementation of these foreign acts are similar 
to the American decision.  While the use of non-suit provisions cannot become 
international customary law,65 it is worth noting the pattern of usage of this 
 
 63. Id. at 381. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Generally, treaties may be accepted as customary international law.  As noted by the ICJ 
in the North Sea Continental Cases, it is possible for the specific terms of treaties to generate 
customary international law subsequent to their adoption.  LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 101 (3d ed. 2000).  However, creation of 
international law does not come easy.  Specifically, to invoke a treaty as custom, one must show 
the following: (1) constant and uniform application of the principle, (2) the practice of states must 
evidence the presence of such a custom as if they were adhering to a legal obligation, not merely 
following habit, and (3) the states who sign the treaty must have an interest in its content.  North 
Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38-41 (Feb. 20). 
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technique in national governments throughout the world.  Simply, if various 
governments spanning across the globe believe that such provisions have 
merit, perhaps they really are viable options to private redress. 
1. South Africa Seeks Forgiveness Over Vengeance 
While the World War II veterans contested established reparation systems 
during the 1990’s in American courtrooms, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa engaged in a similar issue with its citizens to resolve Apartheid 
grievances.66  The leading decision, Azanian Peoples Organization v. The 
President of the Republic of South Africa, responded to the formation of and 
remedies prescribed by the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (the 
“TRC”).67  As expected, citizens exposed to the aftermath of South African 
oppression were dissatisfied with Nelson Mandela’s proposed truth-finding 
tribunal.68 
a. The Commission 
Once the remains of Apartheid dissolved in 1994, Nelson Mandela 
assumed the position of President of South Africa and played an integral part 
in the formation of its Parliament.69  In 1995, the South African Parliament 
enacted the Truth and Reconciliation Act, which gave rise to the TRC.70  The 
TRC had two primary roles, which included both “a truth finding function with 
the power to confer amnesty on an individual basis” and a general objective to 
“promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding.”71  The 
nature of the TRC was very similar to that of other truth commissions 
established previously in Uganda, Bolivia, Argentina, Zimbabwe and Chile to 
resolve their own histories of political and social unrest.72  However, the TRC 
differed in one fundamental way.  While its reformatory predecessors 
established confidential commissions of truth, South African leaders were 
quite insistent in their demand that all oppressors from the Apartheid-era come 
personally before the tribunal to confess their sins to the public.73  The purpose 
 
 66. See Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SALR 637, 638 
(CC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za/data/CL/1796.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2002). 
 67. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 633 (1999). 
 68. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 637. 
 69. Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provisions of Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 5 (Robert I. 
Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 641. 
 72. See Rotberg, supra note 69, at 5. 
 73. Id. (explaining that while other nations “dared not hear testimony in public for fear that it 
might be too inflammatory or arouse retaliation from the ousted military officers . . . the South 
African commission not only insisted on public as well as private testimony . . . but it also went a 
step further and permitted press and television reports”). 
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behind such a practice was clear to both the international community and 
citizens of the modified South African state.  By providing citizens with an 
intimate view of their oppressors on trial, the TRC provided each victim with a 
sense of closure and inner redress.74  Arguably, such a feeling would be worth 
more than the receipt of monetary recovery.  Thus, it could be said that “[t]he 
South African version of a commission empowered a popular understanding 
incrementally, rather than comprehensively by polished summary.”75 
Despite being embraced by numerous South African nationals, many 
citizens were not supportive of the TRC purpose.  Specifically, the applicants 
in Azanian Peoples Organization contested the amnesty provision found in the 
newly ratified South African Constitution, and sought prosecution of 
Apartheid-era criminals.76 
b. Preserving the TRC Purpose 
Proponents of the TRC challenged the amnesty provision by asserting a 
constitutional argument, claiming that the newly formed South African 
government lacked authority to deprive victims of their day in court.77  
Furthermore, proponents asserted that the TRC was not, by definition, a court 
of law and thus lacked the authority to settle such “justiciable disputes.”78  In 
response, “[t]he Court found that the epilogue of the Constitution not only 
authorize[d] Parliament to enact a law providing for amnesty in certain 
circumstances, but oblige[d] it to do so.”79  In addition to such a retort, the 
court based much of its decision on public policy.80 
The South African Constitutional Court considered the grave difficulty that 
would plague the success of victims’ private claims, including missing 
relatives, the inability to link the perpetrators to certain offenses and the 
lengthy time span between the offenses and court dates.  It argued that a 
greater injustice would ensue by allowing victims to pursue claims.81  
 
 74. Id. at 6 (proclaiming that not only is “[t]here is a strong sense that a society can move 
forward only after it comes to terms with its collective angst, . . . [but t]here is an assumption that 
a society emerging from an intrastate cataclysm of violence will remain stable, and prosper, only 
if the facts of the past are made plain”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 645. 
 77. Id. (arguing that the applicants have a “clear right to insist that such wrongdoers should 
properly be prosecuted and punished . . . [and] should be ordered by the ordinary courts of the 
land to pay adequate civil compensation”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 636; see also Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, July 26, 1995, S. Afr., Act 95-34, § 20(7), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/world/rsa/act95_034.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002). 
 80. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 654-60. 
 81. Id. at 648 (“The alternative to the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution of 
offenders is to keep intact the abstract right to such a prosecution for particular persons without 
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Allowing claimants to proceed with a private cause of action under an 
assumption that oppressors would be brought to justice purported to do more 
harm than good.82  While the court did not validate a “blanket immunity” to 
future oppressors, it did seek to legitimize the present amnesty provision due to 
the social climate present in South Africa.83  Indeed, “[d]ecisions of states in 
transition, taken with a view to assisting such transition, are quite different 
from acts of a state covering up its own crimes by granting itself immunity.”84 
2. Chilean Efforts to Forget Past Thwarted By Inter-American 
Commission 
During the late twentieth century, Chilean nationals were also tormented 
and tortured by their own government.85  Under the regime of General 
Pinochet, many citizens lived in a state of terror, awaiting a day when they 
would have an opportunity to bring their oppressors to justice.  Pinochet 
reigned for seventeen years.  A democratic government was then instated and a 
movement began toward a resolution for the atrocities committed.86  
Specifically, as in South Africa, a truth commission was established to sort 
through the turmoil imposed upon Chilean citizens.87  Again, an amnesty 
decree was the subject of much debate.88 
Upon being asked to forgive and forget, victims resorted to a tribunal 
outside of their own judiciary.  They sought adjudication from the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in an effort to preserve their right to 
prosecution.89  Although Azanian Peoples Organization furthered similar 
arguments, the treatment of the Chilean matter yielded quite a different result.  
While the Commission acknowledged the need for pertinent information 
regarding the whereabouts and condition of missing family members, it made a 
 
the evidence to sustain the prosecution successfully, . . . [which] perpetuate[s] their legitimate 
sense of resentment and grief . . . .”). 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 649. The Court stated: “there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a 
need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimi[z]ation.”  Id. at 
639. 
 85. Chanfeau Orayce v. Chile, Cases 11.505 et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R. 512, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1997/ 
chile25-28.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2002). 
 86. Id. at 1. 
 87. Id. at 13. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1. “Their claims concern the fact that there has been neither trial nor identification 
of those responsible nor punishments meted out against the perpetrators of these acts. . . .”  Id. at 
15. 
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further demand of the Chilean government.90  Unlike the South African 
decision, the Commission declared that Chile should “investigate the violations 
committed within its jurisdiction, identify those responsible, and impose the 
pertinent sanctions upon them.”91  The Commission explained that since Chile 
was a party of the American Convention on Human Rights, it possessed a “true 
‘obligation to do something’ in order to effectively guarantee such rights.”92  A 
call for affirmative action replaced the sentiment for silent forgiveness. 
The Chilean decision did illustrate that barring one’s access to a remedy 
was not always a valid state practice.  It did, however, serve the purpose of 
showing another emerging practice of states.  States desired to limit remedies 
to its citizens, as opposed to barring them altogether.93  As articulated below, 
some states have successfully limited individual access to a remedy, skirting an 
international customary right that arguably affords a remedy in all cases 
involving an injury.94 
IV.  LEGAL ANALYSIS: RECTIFYING THE WORLD WAR II CASE DECISIONS IN 
TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW 
The judge in the World War II Case was quick to dismiss the suit because, 
as a matter of treaty interpretation, the treaty, via its plain language, barred any 
claim by the plaintiffs.95  Per the analysis of Judge Walker, Article 14(a) of the 
1951 Treaty of Peace plainly stated that the agreement allowed for a “waiver of 
all ‘other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any 
actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the 
war.’”96  The present claim of the plaintiffs fell squarely within the treaty 
language, “all . . . other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals.”97  
Even though the plaintiffs attempted to rely on a novel California state law to 
skirt the treaty waiver of private claims, their efforts were doomed from the 
 
 90. Chanfeau Orayce, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 512 at 23 (“[T]he State is obliged to use the means 
at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and, if they have been killed, the 
location of their remains.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
 94. See discussion infra Part IV.A.  But see PAUST, supra note 15, at 184 (suggesting that a 
right to sue for human rights violations may embody a natural right). 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 325(1) 
(1987) (stating that “[a]n international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”). 
 96. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 945 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. 
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start because of a foundational constitutional principle.98  Namely, the treaty, 
possessing the status of federal law and thus representing the “law of the land,” 
took precedence over any state law.99  Therefore, the presence of the 
conflicting California state law did not effect the meaning and force of the 
treaty.100 
Although the legal issues facing the World War II Case court were rather 
elementary in nature, comparatively complex arguments were ignored, but 
remained at the disposal of the plaintiffs.  These arguments were inherently 
rooted in theories of customary international law.  Specifically, one could 
argue that the treaty was invalid because it conflicted with a norm of 
customary international law. 
A. Possible Argument—1951 Treaty Had No Effect Because it Conflicted 
with International Customary Law 
As a preliminary issue, international custom represents an established rule 
of international law evinced through uniform and continuous state practice.101  
Unlike a treaty, custom need not be expressly or formally agreed upon for it to 
have force upon all states.102  Simply, these customs or “norms” are the ground 
rules for international activity.103  Applicable to the World War II Case, the 
plaintiffs may have argued that due to the harsh treatment and involuntary 
servitude that resulted from their forced labor during World War II, a human 
rights violation occurred.104  Pursuant to recognized norms of international 
law, victims of human rights violations are entitled to a remedy.105  Thus, 
plaintiffs could have asserted that because the treaty instructed domestic courts 
to bar such victims from any remedy, the treaty was in conflict with customary 
international law and was, thus, invalid.106  However, in saying that the 1951 
Treaty of Peace conflicted with international customary law, one should first 
illustrate that a right to a remedy is truly a customary norm. 
 
 98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 111(1) (1987) 
(stating that “[i]nternational law and international agreements of the United States are law of the 
United States and [are] supreme over the law of the several States”). 
 99. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 100. Id. 
 101. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 710-12 (1900). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 1990) 
 104. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7, available at 
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic3.htm (last visited July 16, 2002) (stating that “[e]very person 
has the right to personal liberty and security” and that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his physical 
liberty”); see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, reprinted in Inter-Am. C.H.R., INTER-AM. Y.B. ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1988, at 978 (1991) [hereinafter Velasquez Rodriguez Case]. 
 105. PAUST, supra note 15, at 212. 
 106. Id. at 184. 
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In Marbury v. Madison,107 the United States Supreme Court first assented 
to the norm that all parties who suffer an injury are entitled to a remedy.108  In 
that opinion, Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[t]he very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection 
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury . . . [and] where there is a legal 
right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right 
is invaded.”109  Noting the competence of courts to hear a specific class of 
cases, Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Fletcher v. Peck110 that judicial 
tribunals “[were] established . . . to decide on human rights.”111  Almost two 
centuries later, this principle of a customary right to a remedy was reaffirmed 
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,112 which stated that “[t]he . . . international law of 
human rights . . . endows individuals with the right to invoke international 
[customary] law, in a competent forum and under appropriate 
circumstances.”113  Furthermore, one could assert that such a norm was 
codified in both The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The 
American Convention on Human Rights.114  Article 8 of the Declaration states 
that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by a competent national 
tribunal for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law.”115  Noting both the Declaration and the Convention 
proves important to illustrate how the right to a remedy has been widely 
accepted by states and tribunals in the international community as a customary 
norm.116 
 
 107. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 108. PAUST, supra note 15, at 198. 
 109. Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163). 
 110. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 111. PAUST, supra note 15, at 199 (quoting Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133). 
 112. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 113. See PAUST, supra note 15, at 200 (quoting the brief of the United States Executive 
Branch in Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876).  Professor Paust opined: “Although international law rarely 
prescribes appropriate penalties or civil remedies, successful claimants should be able to obtain 
actual or compensatory damages, court costs, and possibly attorney fees and travel expenses.”  Id. 
at 212. 
 114. Id. at 198; see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 104, at 994. 
 115. PAUST, supra note 15, at 198. 
 116. In July of 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights specifically applied the 
principles of the American Convention on Human Rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case.  
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 104, at 994.  In the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, during the 
period from 1981 to 1984, 100 to 150 persons disappeared in the Republic of Honduras.  Often 
the victims were kidnapped by force during daylight hours while meandering in public places.  It 
was public knowledge in Honduras that the kidnappings were carried out by military personnel, 
the police or others acting under military order.  Id. at 924-30.  Relying on numerous provisions 
of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court declared that Honduras 
should take its own initiative to hunt down and punish those responsible for the kidnappings.  Id. 
at 1010. 
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Applying the aforementioned analysis to the World War II Case, the 
plaintiffs could have argued with impunity that the 1951 Treaty of Peace 
conflicted directly with principles of customary international law.  Recalling 
the words of the treaty itself, Article 14(a) specifically and plainly waived any 
claim that an aggrieved veteran may have had as a result of injuries suffered 
during World War II.  Practically, this waiver barred plaintiffs’ remedy in this 
context.  The treaty conflicted with an established norm of customary 
international law, namely a right to a remedy for human rights offenses, and 
should have been argued to be invalid.  However, such a hypothetical 
argument of treaty invalidation is not without its weaknesses. 
1. Critique of Plaintiffs’ Possible Argument: The International Legal 
Component 
As outlined above, there exists a possibility that the plaintiffs could have 
argued the 1951 Treaty of Peace to be invalid because it conflicted with 
international customary law.117  In theory, the conflict could arise because the 
treaty barred aggrieved parties from any remedy for a human rights violation, a 
right debatably rooted in customary international law.118  However, upon 
closer analysis, one could assert that a true conflict does not exist between the 
treaty and customary international law.  Even assuming a conflict exists 
between the treaty and the customary norm, it is not entirely clear that the 
customary norm would trump the treaty as a matter of international law.119  
Such arguments take shape when viewing the treaty in question as limiting a 
remedy as opposed to being a complete bar to justice. 
Contained in their response to the filing of the World War II Case, 
Congress stated that each injured veteran received approximately $20,000 in 
damages for their involuntary labor during the war.120  The mere presence of 
the monetary damage award represents access to a quasi-remedy.  Thus, 
plaintiffs were not totally barred from any remedy at all, and, in a sense, their 
customary right was not offended.121  However, the reparation did limit the 
type of remedy the plaintiffs could have received in a jury trial.122  The 
difference between a full remedy and a limited remedy is subtle indeed.  The 
effect of the limited remedy exemplifies the alleged conflict between the treaty 
 
 117. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 118. See PAUST, supra note 15, at 198. 
 119. See 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 86-87 (Elihu 
Lauterpacht ed., 1970). 
 120. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 121. Contra PAUST, supra note 15, at 198. 
 122. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
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and customary international law.123  Two examples support the validity of 
limiting the remedies of aggrieved parties. 
The first example, from a suit similar to the World War II Case, arose out 
of atrocities committed by the Nazi Party during World War II.124  Akin to the 
limitation of remedies outlined in the Japanese suit, individuals enslaved by the 
Nazi Party in the 1940’s were as well limited in their recovery to reparations 
only.125  To date, such victims have received equal amounts from a pooling of 
over $ 4.3 billion, yet have never survived the scrutiny of the U.S. judicial 
system.126  While their pockets are not empty, victims complained that their 
true recovery potential had yet to be realized.127  Supported by the argument of 
the present subsection of this Note, the limitation on recovery would not have 
entirely destroyed the victims right to a remedy.128  Thus, international 
customary norms remained intact.129 
A second example of a state limiting the recovery of its citizens occurred 
in the aforementioned South African decision.130  The South African 
government did grant the victims a quasi-remedy by making public apologies 
and admissions, even though they were denied access to monetary redress for 
the atrocities endured.131  While such a remedy may be inequitable when 
viewed in light of the injuries suffered, a remedy was offered.  Thus, the right 
of an individual to seek a remedy under customary international law was again 
likely preserved.132 
Even assuming a conflict existed between international customary law, 
which arguably grants an automatic right to a remedy for human rights 
violations, and the 1951 Treaty of Peace, which wholly denies such a remedy, 
it remains unclear whether the norm would trump the treaty as a matter of 
international law.  Legal scholars differ in their interpretation of the issue.  
Particular materials, however, can be turned to for guidance.  The legal 
document that resolves the dispute is Article 38 of the Statute for the 
International Court of Justice. 
Expressed in the Statute for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), 
“[t]he Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international 
 
 123. See generally PAUST, supra note 15, at 198-210.  Paust never implied that a limitation to 
a remedy would directly violate international custom.  Id. 
 124. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 380 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 381. 
 127. Id. at 378. 
 128. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text . 
 129. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text. 
 130. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 131. See Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SALR 637, 638 
(CC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za/data/CL/1796.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2002). 
 132. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text. 
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law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . . international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states.”133  While the statute itself was enacted to 
assist the ICJ in interpreting which legal principles apply in cases before it, the 
provisions could theoretically aid other tribunals (for instance, as persuasive 
authority in United States federal and state courts) when ruling on issues of 
international law.  As Professor Schachter explained, the prevailing sentiment 
amongst contemporary legal scholars has been a demand for increased 
“positive science of law.”134  Simply, scholars desire a mechanism that makes 
international law “realistic and definite,”135 making legal application more 
objective.  Arguably, Article 38 represents the demystifying mechanism that 
could aid a variety of international tribunals in the realm of international legal 
interpretation.  Thus, because “international conventions” or treaties are cited 
first in Article 38, could one reasonably infer that such agreements are 
controlling over international custom?  Scholars differ slightly in their 
opinions. 
In terms of articulating a hierarchical strata, Hans Kelsen believed that the 
highest rung was occupied by international customary law, rather than 
treaties.136  Kelsen argued that treaties were created in the spirit of applicable 
general principles contained within customary law.137  In other words, treaty 
law possesses the character of international law.138  Similarly, Sir Gerald M. 
Fitzmaurice insisted that “treaties are no more a source of law than an ordinary 
private law contract,” binding no other parties than those participating in the 
agreement itself.139  However, two scholars in particular thought otherwise. 
Professor Henkin disagreed in part and believed the “maxim, lex specialis 
derogat generali, the specific prevails over the general, was an accepted guide; 
it may give priority either to treaty or custom.”140  When assigning authority, 
one should first analyze the intent of the contracting nations as either replacing 
 
 133. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 51 (emphasis added). 
 134. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 35-36 (1991) 
(stating that the “doctrine which became dominant in the nineteenth century and continues to 
prevail today lays down veritable conditions for ascertaining and validating legal prescriptions”), 
reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 52. 
 135. Id. 
 136. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 108 (Clarendon 
Press ed., 1992). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. SIR GERALD M. FITZMAURICE, SOME PROBLEMS REGARDING THE FORMAL SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 157-58 (Von Asbeck et al. eds., 1958), reprinted in  HENKIN ET AL., 
supra note 65, at 95. 
 140. Id. (second emphasis added) (noting that while “it may be ‘natural’ to apply a treaty . . . 
[it] should not be taken to mean that a treaty provision necessarily prevails over a customary 
rule”). 
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a treaty with customary rule or vice versa.  If such intent is ambiguous from 
the wording of the agreement, “treaty and custom have equal weight.”141  
Richard Baxter, in supporting Henkin, suggested that “[a]s one looks . . . into 
the future, it should be quite clear that treaty law will increasingly gain 
paramountcy over customary international law [because t]he treaty-making 
process is a rational and orderly one, . . . [serving to strengthen custom] and 
simplify its application.”142  This view complements Schachter’s view that 
international scholars and practitioners yearn for a more scientific or objective 
application of the law.143  As observed since the end of World War II, treaties 
should ideally be regarded as dynamic creatures that evolve and erode over 
time, bowing to the ever-changing tides in the international legal 
community.144 
Based upon the surrounding circumstances of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, it 
would be prudent to assume that the World War II Case court would have 
agreed with the assertions of both Lauterpacht and Baxter.  As noted, the court 
in the World War II Case was searching for a way to support the plain meaning 
of the 1951 agreement.  Supported by Lauterpaucht’s theories, where a specific 
intent or language can be discovered, such an intent or language will be 
controlling, even in light of international customary law.145  Indeed, the intent 
of the drafters in the 1951 Treaty was to trade litigants’ rights to sue for a more 
peaceful and progressive relationship with Japan.  Thus, the intent was 
identified and was properly viewed as controlling. 
As well, the World War II Case comported with the theories of Richard 
Baxter.146  Baxter saw the treaty-making process as a rational and orderly one.  
The provisions contained within the four corners of the agreement should be 
afforded great weight and should be paramount to all other legal precedent.147  
Just as Article 38 of the ICJ demanded that treaties be treated as the highest 
authority, so did the court in the World War II Case.  The non-suit treaty 
provision, while in violation of state law, trumped the state law provision, not 
only for Constitutional reasons, but also because Article 38 demanded that 
treaties be controlling against domestic laws of states.  Thus, one could say that 
 
 141. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 95 (explaining that “[i]t is presumed that a treaty is not 
terminated or altered by subsequent custom in the absence of evidence that the parties had that 
intention”). 
 142. RICHARD BAXTER, TREATIES AND CUSTOM 101 (1970), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., 
supra note 65, at 97. 
 143. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 52. 
 144. Id. at 95 (“International agreements . . . have proliferated since the end of World War II.  
More than 30,000 treaties have been registered with the United Nations since 1945.”).  Virtually 
every aspect of social life affecting transnational relations and intercourse is dealt with through 
treaties. 
 145. LAUTERPAUCHT, supra note 119, at 87. 
 146. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 97. 
 147. Id. 
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use of international law allowed the court to reach the same conclusion it 
reached by using domestic law.  However, even after offering the 
aforementioned analysis, it remains unclear if a true answer exists.  Illustrating 
the second weakness in plaintiffs’ possible argument, it remains unclear 
whether customary norms supercede international agreements as a matter of 
domestic law. 
2. Critique of Plaintiffs’ Possible Argument: The Domestic Legal 
Component 
Similar to the lack of clarity evident in deciding whether customary norms 
trump treaties as a matter of international law, rectifying the relationship 
between the two legal principles on a domestic plane comes with no greater 
ease.  The confusion as to which rule should control is particularly evident in 
the language of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.148  
Specifically, Comment d to Section 115 of the Restatement suggests the 
novelty of the inquiry in the U.S. domestic judicial system.149  It states that 
“[i]t has also not been authoritatively determined whether a rule of customary 
international law that developed after, and is inconsistent with, an earlier 
statute or international agreement of the United States should be given effect as 
the law of the United States.”150  Thus, after reading the Restatement, one is 
left with little guidance. 
In an effort to truly resolve the relationship between customary norms and 
international agreements on a domestic level, one must turn to the words of 
legal scholar, Louis Henkin.  According to Henkin, customary international 
law is “made” by federal courts as though it were federal law and is binding on 
the several states.151  Explaining his theory by way of necessity, Henkin feared 
the result that would ensue if all fifty states were left to their own 
interpretations of customary international law.152  For purposes of creating a 
 
 148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987). 
 149. Id. at cmt. d. 
 150. Id. 
 151. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 238 (2d ed. 1996). 
 152. Id.  As stated by Henkin: 
[B]ut if for the states customary international law had only the status of their common 
law, it was presumably subject to modification or repeal by the state legislature. If so, too, 
state courts could decide for themselves what international law requires, and issues of 
customary international law, unlike questions arising under treaties, would not raise 
federal questions and could not be appealed to the Supreme Court for final adjudication. 
Fifty states could have fifty different views on some issue of international law and the 
federal courts might still have another view. Indeed, not only would the states be free to 
disregard the views of the federal courts, but in cases where a federal court is required to 
apply the law of the state in which it sits, the court would have to apply the state’s view 
on disputed questions of international law . . . . 
Id. 
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uniform interpretation of international law in general, federal court decisions 
based upon prevailing customs were viewed to create federal common law.153  
Thus, Henkin presumed that international customary law should be labeled 
federal common law.154 
Accepting international customary law as the domestic equivalent of 
federal common law, one must further venture to find the domestic equivalent 
of international agreements.  As stated by Henkin, “[i]n the case of treaties, the 
Supreme Court has read the Constitution as giving treaties and acts of 
Congress equal authority as law.”155  Therefore, the equality of treaties and 
statutes in United States domestic law appears to be a firm rule.156  From this 
point, a logical leap is merited.  While Henkin was very careful not to suppose 
that the Framers of the Constitution intended a higher constitutional status for 
treaties than for customary law,157 one could conclude this hierarchy to be true 
by pitting federal common law (customary law) against a federal statute 
(treaties).158  In terms of general constitutional jurisprudence, statutory law will 
always trump common law in times of conflict.159  Applying this notion to the 
treaty and custom debate, a similar result should occur.  This notion alone 
would defeat a plaintiff’s argument that suggests, on a domestic level, that a 
treaty should be invalid because it conflicts with international customary law.  
However, even if such a logical leap is found to be premature by a court, it is 
unlikely that such a tribunal would venture to rule in the alternative—that 
custom trumps a treaty.  As articulated by Henkin, jurists yearn for guidance in 
assembling a domestic hierarchy for international legal structures.160  Until 
then, confusion will reign supreme. 
In sum, to have succeeded in the aforementioned arguments, plaintiffs in 
the World War II Case would have had to prove the following: (1) that a true 
conflict existed between customary norms and the 1951 Treaty; (2) that the 
norm trumped the treaty as a matter of international law; and (3) that the norm 
trumped the treaty as a matter of domestic law.  Because of the relative 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 241. 
 156. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 211. 
 157. Id. at 237. 
 158. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 177 (1979) (“Historically, it is made quite differently 
from the Continental code.  The code precedes judgments; the common law follows them.  The 
code articulates in chapters, sections and paragraphs the rules in accordance with which 
judgments are given.”).  From these words, one could infer that because the common law 
“follows” the statutes, common law comes into being from a higher source of law which dictates 
and controls it.  Arguably, courts create and alter common law in the spirit of the foundational 
principles found in statutes.  Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 246. 
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uncertainty exhibited by the above-mentioned courts with reference to each of 
the issues, it is likely that the plaintiffs would fall short of their goal. 
V.  POLICY ANALYSIS 
The previous section of this Note stated that the World War II Case was 
correct in its legal conclusion to uphold the 1951 Treaty non-suit provisions 
based upon both international and United States domestic law.  Once the legal 
analysis is disposed of, it is worthwhile to inquire whether the decision 
furthered any policies crucial to the maintenance of U.S. foreign relations.  As 
suggested in the Introduction, the decision in the World War II Case provided 
that sovereign nations should act in a manner that is not selfish and should take 
into account the effect of domestic decisions on the entire international 
community.  Specifically, such a method of action was termed, “looking 
outside the box.”161  If the 1951 Treaty non-suit provision was voided by 
judicial interpretation, a catastrophic message would have been sent to the 
global community.  Indeed, international legal skeptics would have had the 
fuel necessary to prove that, once again, an international superpower acted in a 
manner that grossly ignored international law by disregarding treaty provisions 
that are deemed inconvenient to a national interest.  Rather, the decision of the 
World War II Case court shouted to the world that international law, in the 
form of treaties, is binding and should be taken seriously.  As a result, the 
United States indirectly supported international legal legitimacy and urged 
other nations to do the same.  In this final section of the Note, an outline will 
be offered to show the positive policy effects furthered by the decision in the 
case at bar. 
A. 1951 Treaty of Peace Abrogated by a Later United States Statute: A Wise 
Policy Decision? 
When the United States Congress determines that a particular treaty has 
been outdated or fails to give effect properly to the ideals it sought to uphold, it 
may, under a general consensus, pass a statute that conflicts with the treaty 
provisions itself.162  Arguably, the parties to World War II Case suit could 
pressure the federal legislature in the future to pass such a statute for purposes 
 
 161. See discussion supra Part I. 
 162. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1888).  In Whitney, the plaintiff sued 
to recover amounts paid under protest to the Collector of Customs at New York in satisfaction of 
duties assessed upon plaintiff’s shipments of sugar from the Dominican Republic.  Plaintiff 
alleged that sugar from the Hawaiian Islands was admitted free of duty into the United States, and 
claimed that a clause of a treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic 
guaranteed that no higher duty would be assessed upon goods imported into the United States 
from the Dominican Republic than was assessed upon goods imported from any other foreign 
country.  An act of Congress was passed that was found to have superceded the treaty between 
the United States and the Dominican Republic because it occurred later in time.  Id. at 190-92. 
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of receiving justice.  In the framework of a civil action, a court could view the 
statute and the conflicting treaty provision together and decide if, in fact, the 
two cannot co-exist.163  Specifically, when the two relate to the same subject, 
courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to them both, 
if that can be done without violating the language of either.164  However, if the 
court rules that the two cannot possibly live in harmony with one another, the 
document adopted later in time will control the other.165 
Thus, because the World War II Case involves a treaty waiver of United 
States citizens’ right to sue, it is possible that if convinced, Congress could 
enact a code that would conflict with the 1951 Treaty of Peace, granting 
veterans a right to sue.166  As a policy issue though, it is unlikely that the 
federal government would use its power to controvert the language of the 
treaty.  As stated by Dulles and scores of politicians involved in the ratification 
of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, it proves worthwhile for the provisions of the 
treaty to be upheld because the nation has an interest of moving on from its 
wartime conflicts with the East.167  The hardships endured by veterans were 
not questioned.  The government as a whole, however, decided to take action 
in concert with the single voice of the nation.168  That single voice of the 
Executive demanded that the nation move on as opposed to dwelling on past 
atrocities.169  Thus, on a policy level, it seems highly unlikely that a future 
statute would be enacted for purposes of abrogating the 1951 Treaty of Peace.  
Such action would support the argument of international legal skeptics as 
outlined in the next section of the Note.  Specifically, skeptics argue that 
international law has little effect and is easily discarded by international 
superpowers.170 
 
 163. Id. at 194. 
 164. Id. 
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B. Proving International Legal Skeptics Wrong: Optimist Views Should be 
Supported in Furtherance of Public Policy 
“Skeptical” legal philosophers have long felt that both international law 
and the principles it seeks to uphold prove rather ineffective because, at face 
value, the international legal system lacks traditional enforcement tools.171  
Conversely, the World War II Case illustrated the effectiveness of an 
international instrument, namely, treaties.  There, treaty signatories adhered to 
the verbiage of the instrument and enforced its provisions without any pressure 
from other members of the international community.  However, when so 
frequently nations disregard treaties or general custom, as established by 
international practice, onlookers are quick to conclude that the system itself is 
flawed and that individual nation states are free to act as they choose.172  
International legal skeptics fail to recognize that the absence of a legislative 
body is not at all fatal to the legitimacy of the international schematic.173 
Treaties represent such a non-legislative legal entity, which have proven 
rather effective on a consistent basis.174  Yet, contemporary scholars who 
subscribe to the skeptic’s school of thought have recently questioned even the 
effectiveness of treaties and other enforcement mechanisms in the realm of 
international human rights.175  Specifically, where treaties seek to deny human 
rights victims of their day in court, academics have claimed that such 
restrictive bi-lateral agreements do more harm than good.176  If able to jump 
through the varying procedural hoops at the domestic court level, some 
scholars argue that human rights victims should be afforded a right to name 
their oppressors in the framework of a domestic civil action.177  Otherwise, 
they argue, the interests of the negotiating parties, namely, those politicians 
with party agendas, will prevail in spite of the private interests of citizens.178  
 
 171. Richard A. Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law: Gaps in 
Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 249 (1964) (“The status of controverted behavior as legal or 
illegal is quite problematical . . . because no central institutions exist to make judgments that will 
be treated as authoritative by states.”). 
 172. Id. (explaining that when such violations of international law are committed by a leading 
world super-power, it seems easy for them to disregard the offense and escape sanctions). 
 173. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 26 (2d ed. 1979). 
 174. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 95; see also supra note 144 and accompanying 
text.  By definition, treaties are formed by the executive as opposed to the legislative bodies of 
governments.  Id. 
 175. See Developments in the Law—Corporate Liability for Violations of International 
Human Rights Law, supra note 11, at 2026. 
 176. Boyd, supra note 11, at 283-84. 
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 178. Id. (arguing that “the notion of fundamental human rights embodies an understanding 
that individual interests prevail over state prerogatives”). 
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However, if such individual interests prevailed, much harm would come upon 
the international system. 
Viewing the international legal structure in a completely different light, 
legal “optimists” posit that the struggle for legitimacy in international law is a 
false inquiry.  On a metaphysical level, man is bound by international law 
simply because he desires order in his existence.179  Similarly, states are bound 
by the rules of the international realm because they themselves are founded on 
the binding nature of law, creating a stable and relatively predictable society.180  
Furthering the theories of the optimist faction of international legal scholars, 
Professor Akehurst qualified the often-challenged philosophy of his colleagues 
with a paradox.  Relying on a premise touted by the skeptic regime, Akehurst 
admitted that often powerful nation states take advantage of their international 
stature and support laws that inherently further their own interests.181  While 
such a system may be anti-democratic, “it is unlikely that [such states] will 
create laws that . . . they will be tempted to break.”182  Thus, such laws will be 
followed not because of the presence of an international police system, but 
because nations choose to do so voluntarily.183  In a sense, the end justifies the 
means. 
Following the aforementioned analysis, one could say that the World War 
II Case furthered the cause of international legal optimists—simply, that 
international law has “teeth” and should be followed in furtherance of its 
existence and effectiveness.184  Countering the view of skeptics, the court 
furthered a notion that, in practice, nations actually feel obligated to adhere to 
international law; no choice is available.185  Furthermore, to preserve the 
effectiveness of treaty law, an established form of international law, nations 
must adhere to its provisions.186  By deciding in favor of the non-suit provision 
in the 1951 Treaty, the World War II Case fueled the fire of the optimist 
faction.  Essentially speaking for the United States as a whole, the court 
affirmed the principle that states are bound by the rules of the international 
realm because they themselves are founded on the binding nature of law, 
creating a stable and relatively predictable society.187  Without honoring such 
international legal provisions, the United States would be snubbing the reason 
for its own existence since arguably, nations receive their legitimacy from the 
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mere presence of international law.  Members of states pay homage to the 
international legal system by honoring the laws it imposes upon them.188  
Therefore, in honoring the 1951 Treaty in its entirety, the World War II Case 
court furthered the policy of the necessity to follow stated international 
principles.189 
C. In re World War II Case Upholds Similar Policies Stressed in South 
Africa 
At the close of World War II, while negotiating the particulars of the 1951 
Treaty of Peace, John Foster Dulles stated, “Leaving open the possibility of 
future [war reparation] claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a 
lasting peace [between the United States and Japan].”190  Almost fifty years 
later, in a land left scarred by decades of Apartheid oppression, Justice 
Mahomed of the Constitutional Court for South Africa uttered, “those who 
negotiated the Constitution [of South Africa] made a deliberate choice, 
preferring understanding over vengeance, reparation over retaliation, ubuntu 
over victimization.”191  While thousands of miles and decades of time 
separated the two aforementioned declarants, it is possible that their argument 
for policy was the same. 
In an effort to rebuild both the government and hearts of its citizens, the 
newly instated South African government declared in the 1990’s that it would 
allow those who committed atrocities against its citizens during Apartheid to 
confess their deeds before the public in exchange for their amnesty and 
exemption from private causes of action.192  As expected, numerous members 
of the public demanded justice and found no comfort in allowing their 
oppressors to be set free.193  The foresight of various South African leaders, 
namely Nelson Mandela, allowed the shattered nation to again rebuild and 
become an international economic contender.194  A non-suit provision in the 
South African Constitution theoretically violated a citizen’s right to confront 
his oppressor.  Government officials, however, urged angered individuals to 
look forward for the betterment of the nation as a whole.195  Indeed, South 
Africa was not claiming that citizens should forget the recent past.  Rather, it 
desired to heal the inner wounds of the soul by recognizing that the future of 
the nation was bright, transforming grief and anger into a mature 
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understanding that progressed national reconstruction.196  Without some 
sacrifice of personal claims, the future of the nation would have been halted 
due to scores of lengthy litigation.197 
Similarly, the words of Dulles came at a time of national healing during 
the post-World War II Era.  For the American nation to rebuild and allow its 
one-time enemies to gain strength for purposes of one day becoming economic 
allies, personal interests of aggrieved citizens needed to be seen as secondary 
to national interests.198  Like their African counterpart, the United States 
desired to further a philosophy of understanding over vengeance to meet the 
future without hatred.199  The World War II Case decision affirmed the notion 
that American veterans should, like oppressed South African citizens, turn the 
other cheek in an effort to progress the stability of international relations.  In 
short, the greater good should prevail. 
D. The Cost to International Legitimacy Far Outweighs the Benefit of Suit 
Before speculating about the amounts recoverable under a victim’s private 
cause of action, it is necessary to view what they have received under the 
provisions of The 1951 Treaty of Peace.  Contained within the Statement of 
Interest of the United States of America, the governmental response to the 
World War II Case, the following figures prove most thought provoking: 
Consistent with its congressional mandate, the War Claims Commission paid 
claimants who were prisoners of war in the hands of the Japanese a specific 
amount for each day of captivity of the war. Specifically, prisoners of war 
were paid $1 per day for each day the government by which they were held 
violated its obligation to furnish them the quantity of food for which they were 
entitled as prisoners under the Geneva Convention related to prisoners of war. 
Individuals were also paid $1.50 per day for each day they were used as forced 
labor or otherwise mistreated in violation of the Geneva Convention. A person 
who was captured at Bataan and remained a prisoner of war for the duration of 
the war would have been compensated approximately $3,103.50. Adjusted for 
inflation using the published Consumer Price Indexes for June 1951 (25.9%) 
and June 2000 (172.3%), the present day value of that amount is approximately 
$20,646.200 
Arguably, the award described above is nominal considering the emotional 
and physical turmoil experienced by the individual plaintiffs.  Yet, when court 
costs, attorney’s fees, and emotional hardship incurred by the mere filing of the 
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action, are figured into the damage equation, the gain appears significant.  
Furthermore, as described in Burger-Fischer, Iwanowa, Azanian Peoples 
Organization and In re Nazi Era, the mere fact that the transgressions occurred 
so long ago works against a party asserting a private claim.201  Another 
principle absent in any of the previously cited case law is the theory that 
damage awards theoretically shrink in class action suits.  As the award is 
spread around, the shares distributed decrease in value. When coupled with the 
numerous procedural and jurisdictional hurdles involved in such a case, the 
nominal reparation amount seems fair on its face. 
Keeping in mind the possible gain to reap from a suit of this nature, one 
must seriously consider the subsequent harm on international relations.  Even 
though Japan has more than recovered economically since the conclusion of 
the Second World War, a further financial demand will no doubt frustrate the 
trust established between the United States and its East Asian counterpart.202  
War is a time when the ugliest faces of humankind reveal themselves.  To 
reopen old wounds would compromise the sense of closure already achieved 
by so many war veterans who would just as soon move on.  Analogous in part 
to the desire of the South African government to seek a more peaceful and 
productive future, the United States utilized the 1951 Treaty as its own truth 
commission, yearning for understanding and reparation as opposed to 
vengeance and retaliation.203  The policy of forward thinking no doubt 
prevailed, supporting the maintenance of pre-existing international 
relationships. 
E. Japan Smells a Rat: That Rat is an Attorney 
In response to the suits filed against various Japanese corporations in 1999, 
certain Japanese politicians raised suspicions as to the reasoning for the timing 
of the suits.  The World War II Case was filed in Los Angeles on December 7, 
1999, at exactly 10:55 a.m., the precise moment in Los Angeles of the 1941 
Pearl Harbor attack.204  Undoubtedly, when such news reached the East, 
certain members of the Japanese population were enraged over the public 
statement being made by American citizens.  That was the intent of Edward D. 
Fagan, attorney for the plaintiffs in the World War II Case.205 
Arguably, Japanese politicians were drawing conclusions that should have 
alarmed American citizens.  The suit was originally filed by lawyers who had 
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just come off a victory lap from their recent triumph in Europe with regard to 
Holocaust-Era claims against German corporations.206  A one billion dollar 
damage settlement was recovered for the various Holocaust survivors who had 
made the lucky list under the class action suit.207  While not directly stated, it 
could be inferred, as the Japanese did, that the World War II Case was the 
result of a money hungry attorney who wanted to utilize arguments from the 
European suit to recover substantial funds from the Japanese.208  It was easy 
money.  The observation follows with the assumption that perhaps the 
attorneys in question did not have justice in mind, but rather their children’s 
college funds.  In the following passage, attorney Edward Fagan illustrated his 
rationale behind the filing of the suit: 
A goal of the suits is to bring so much public pressure on the Japanese that 
they will opt for a political settlement similar to the one being brokered among 
European firms, the U.S. and the German government . . . targeting Japanese 
banks would open the issue to scrutiny from such regulators as state 
controllers, banking committee members, and other entities susceptible to 
public pressure . . .209 
When one views this statement of lawyer strategy together with the intent 
of the members of the class action suit in the World War II Case, it is apparent 
that the two conflict.  Throughout the suit, many plaintiffs went on record as 
saying that they desired to have their day in court for purposes of revealing the 
details of wartime offenses committed against American soldiers in the 
Pacific.210  While damages were important to them, their primary concern was 
to educate the public.211  Thus, the settlement strategy of the lead attorney 
arguably controverted the needs and wants of his clients.  Indeed, something 
was awry.212 
The Japanese responded to these observations by exclaiming that these 
claims were a “form of extortion” and that if the United States desired to do so, 
the gloves essentially would come off.213  In an effort to combat the claims and 
show that America was not without guilt in the Second World War, Japanese 
officials voiced a desire to surface the questionable usage of atomic warfare in 
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both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.214  Arguably, tensions would have soared had 
the World War II Case gone before a jury. 
Dulles feared that allowing such suits to prevail would hinder progressive 
international relations with Japan.215  These quotes made by Japanese officials 
demonstrate that the fears of Dulles came close to being true.  For purposes of 
supporting the aforementioned policy arguments throughout this section of the 
piece, it seemed crucial that Justice Walker thwart the efforts of attorneys like 
Edward Fagan in an effort to preserve pre-existing international relationships 
and global stability.  Otherwise, the efforts and intentions of treaty negotiators 
like John Foster Dulles would be undermined. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As a result of the prior analysis one can begin to view the tantamount 
importance of preserving international rules of law.  Derogating from such 
established rules of law would prove catastrophic in that each nation would be 
free to act on its will alone.  While the World War II Case represented a re-
affirmation of established treaty law, the subject matter of its decision is 
contested even today.  Recently, Anthony D’Amato, a professor of law at 
Northwestern University, filed an action in federal court on behalf of more 
than 400,000 American citizens who were killed or injured during World War 
II.  They seek over one trillion dollars in reparations.  It is likely that they will 
meet the same preclusion and jurisdictional obstacles described in this Note.  It 
is almost certain that they will fail.  Otherwise, a windfall of suits will plague 
the judicial system for years to come.  Indeed, to protect the purpose and 
policy prudently set forth in post-war treaties, veterans must now, more than 
ever, “take one for the team.” 
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